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THE THIN SKULL PLAINTIFF CONCEPT:
EVASIVE OR PERSUASIVE
Gary L. Bahr * and Bruce N Graham * *
The vast number of commentaries which discuss the unforeseen
consequences of negligent torts once moved Dean Prosser to observe
that "[tihere is perhaps no other one issue in the law of torts over which
so much controversy has raged, and concerning which there has been
so great a deluge of legal writing."1 Buried beneath Prosser's "deluge"
lies the little noticed thin skull plaintiff. He is the plaintiff with a cervi-
cal spine weakness who, in a fender bender, suffers a crippling whip-
lash,2 the defendant store-keeper's customer with congenital heart
disease who is immobilized after she trips over the store steps,3 or the
tubercular train passenger whom the defendant railroad greets in court
after a derailment results in his impotency.4 In short, he is the sort of
fellow who gives "the good hands people" sweaty palms.
An exhumation of the thin skull plaintiff concept is justified if for
no other reason than to dispel the many misconceptions we presently
have about the principle. Generally conceived as a judicial invention
of the early twentieth century, the thin skull principle is uniformly re-
stricted to cases of personal injuries in negligent torts and is tradition-
ally explained away as an ,exception to the proximate cause axiom
limiting a defendant's liability to only foreseeable consequences.5
* Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport. B.S. 1966, University of South Dakota;
J.D. 1969, University of South Dakota Law School; LL.M. 1970, New York University Law
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1. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 250 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. Self v. Johnson, 124 So. 2d 324 (La. 1960).
3. Sonson v. J.C. Penney Co., 361 Pa. 572, 65 A.2d 382 (1949).
4. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Akin, 138 Ark. 10, 210 S.W. 350 (1919). See also Steinhauser v.
Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); Thompson v. Lupone, 135 Conn. 236, 62 A. 2d
861 (1948); Baltimore City Pass. R.R. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1883); Ominsky v. Charles
Weinhagen & Co., 113 Minn. 422, 129 N.W. 845 (1911); Watson v. Rheinderknecht, 82
Minn. 235, 84 N.W. 798 (1901); Reegan v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 76 Minn. 90, 78 N.W.
965 (1899); McCahUll v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911); Lock-
wood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E. 2d 541 (1964).
5. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 1, at 262; F. JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 190 (2d ed. 1964); Linden, Down with Foreseeability of Thin Skulls andRescu-
ers, 47 CAN. B. REv. 545 (1969); Comment, Taking the Plaintiff as You FindHim, 16 DRAKE
L. REv. 49 (1967); Note, Steinhauser v. Hertz Coq., 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 779 (1970). See also
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Unfortunately, the accuracy of that modem understanding is as
limiting as it is succinct. Tucked neatly away in a crevice of Prosser's
Mount Proximate Cause, the thin skull principle has been interred by
decades of dogmatic legal apathy. Indeed, its scant recognition by the
literature of the torts field indicates that the thin skull principle borders
on the pretentious.
This article, an effort to rectify some of this cavalier ignorance
about the thin skull principle, will recount its long history, not only
within its familiar neighborhood of proximate cause, but throughout
tort law. By identifying the origins of the principle in the foundations
of early jurisprudence, this historical analysis will disclose the thin
skull principle as one of the few unchanged surviving elements of our
ancient legal heritage. That history, in turn, will challenge the legiti-
macy of treating the thin skull as an exception as well as provide the
basis for a fuller understanding of the principle's use and abuse today.
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The thin skull principle's aphorism, that a defendant greets his
plaintiff as he finds him, obscures its simplicity. Fundamentally, the
principle requires both a pre-existing physical condition within the
plaintiff and conduct by the defendant which operates on that condi-
tion so as to produce aggravated injuries. However, the interaction of
these factors has led to some misunderstanding as to when the thin
skull principle is at work and when it disguises the application of some
other notion.
By way of further elaboration of the nature of the thin skull princi-
ple, it is important to distinguish it from two allied but distinctively
separate rules with which the thin skull principle is easily confused.
The first of these rules, the "true value" or "shabby millionaire" rule,6
addresses the issueof damages in declaring that just as foreseeability is
not an issue in determining the extent of injury under the thin skull
principle, foreseeability factors are also improper in determining the
extent of damages those injuries cause. As one court has stated:
[I]f a person fires across a road when it is dangerous to do so
and kills a man who is in receipt of a large income, he will be
liable for the whole damage, however great, that may have
Rowe, The Demise ofthe Thin SkullRule, 40 MoD. L. REv. 377 (1977) (Rowe notes both the
scanty authority and the division of views on the application of the thin skull rule to prop-
erty losses)[hereinafter cited as Demise of the Thin Skull Rule]; Williams, The Risk Princi-
ple, 77 L.Q. Rnv. 179 (1961).
6. See Demise of the Thin Skull Rule, supra note 5, at 378.
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resulted to his family, and cannot set up that he could not
have reasonably expected to have injured any one but a
labourer.7
The "true value" rule operates to dismiss foreseeability as an ele-
ment in identifying the damages that are to be compensated; the thin
skull principle operates to dismiss foreseeability in identifying the in-
jury for which damages are to be ascertained. 8 The similarity of these
perspectives has, no doubt, been responsible for much of the apparent
confusion of the two rules.9
In a related vein, the thin skull notion is often encountered in
questions concerning "cause-in-fact" issues. Here, the question of
whether there exists a physical, as opposed to legal, relationship be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the claimed injury may be
presented in several contexts. In its simplest form, the defendant may
claim that before the accident, the plaintiff had the same injury in the
same form and in the same degree as he had after the accident.' 0 For
example, he may assert that a back complaint after an automobile acci-
dent is actually a long-standing postural defect which was unaffected
by the accident. More commonly, the defendant asserts that before the
incident in suit the plaintiff had the same condition, and that although
the post-accident condition is more serious than the prior condition, the
claimed injury is nothing more than a result of the natural progress of
7. Smith v. London & S.W. Ry., L.R. 6 C.P. 14, 22-23 (1870). See also Williams, The
Risk Principle, 77 L.Q. Rev. 179 (1961).
8. For example, in McBroom v. State, 226 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1975), the plaintiff, an
inmate in a state correctional institution, sought compensation from the state for injuries
received in a shop accident. The court found liability and then proceeded to determine that
the plaintiff may have been entitled to greater damages because his convict status would
make rehabilitation even more difficult. The "true value" of his injury addressed the issue
of the plaintiff's compensation. See also Robinson v. Standard Oil of Ind., 89 Ind. App. 167,
166 N.E. 160 (1929).
9. See, e.g., Becker v. D. & E. Distrib. Co., 247 N.W. 2d 727, 730 (Iowa 1976) (citing
McBroom v. State, 226 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1975), a true value case, as an example of the thin
skull principle); Wolfe v. Checker Taxi Co., 299 Mass. 225, 12 N.E. 2d 849 (1938) (citing
Larson v. Boston Elevated Ry., 212 Mass. 262, 98 N.E. 1048 (1912), a thin skull case as an
example of a true value case); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages §§ 80-82 (1965) (combining the thin
skull principle and true value rules without distinction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 461 comment b (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEmENT 2d]. Prosser considers the thin
skull principle and true value rule as "obviously related" and, to the degree they both ad-
dress the issue of injury, the resemblance is apparent. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 262. How-
ever, apart from separate historical origins, the rules differ both in the method of their
application and the sequence of their application. The categorical decision (to recognize an
injury or not) of the thin skull cases is addressed prior to the variable decision (the amount
of compensation) of true value cases. As a result, different procedures may be utilized (such
as rules of evidence) in the resolution of the issues presented in each context.
10. Annot., 2 A.L.R. 3d 294 (1965).
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the prior ill and was unaffected by the accident." Hence, in a corn-
ilaint for alleged activation of a pre-existing dormant cancer, the de-
fendant may admit that the injured person did not suffer from the
claimed injury before the accident but may urge instead that the post-
accident condition developed naturally from some other pre-existing
condition. In a suit to recover for insanity claimed to have been caused
by a collision, the defendant may admit plaintifi's sanity prior to the
accident but contend that the plaintiff had syphilis before the accident
and that the post-accident insanity was caused by that prior condi-
tion.12 Finally, the defendant may claim that the arthritic plaintiff's
injury was caused by post-accident factors which are unrelated to either
his conduct or negligence. Thus, the plaintiffs claim for back injuries
as a result of an accident would be dismissed if the defendant were able
to establish that the plaintiffs injuries were attributable to football in-
juries suffered the day after the crash. In each of these situations, the
court is asked to look for intervening or superseding physical causes
which act so as to break the causal chain between the defendant's acts
and the plaintiffs injury. It is important to understand that this factual
question is prefatory to a consideration of the legal relationship in-
volved in the thin skull principle's sphere.' 3 Nonetheless, like the "true
value" rule, causation issues have been frequently misunderstood as
thin skull issues, sometimes producing mysterious results.'
4
With this preliminary understanding in mind, it becomes appro-
priate to approach a discussion of the origins of the thin skull principle.
Such an investigation, it is hoped, will yield the necessary insight into
the thin skull's rationale so that a fuller appreciation of the principle's
application is possible.
II. EVASIVE HISTORICAL VALUES AND RATIONALE
It is proper to initiate this historical analysis by explaining that the
purpose in exploring the origins of the thin skull principle is not only to
chronicle its roots, but also to explain its development. This analysis
will aid in understanding the underlying rationales for the principle, in
contributing to a clearer definition of its role, and in providing a secure
basis for modem utilizations of the principle.
The genesis of the thin skull principle is widely attributed to a
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id
14. See Evans v. SJ. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963) (Judge Friendly
discusses the confusion in this area).
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1901 English decision: Dulieu v. White & Sons. 5 The pregnant plain-
tiff had been working behind a bar in her husband's tavern when the
defendant, driving a carriage past the establishment, lost control of his
horse and collided with the building. The woman, though physically
untouched, claimed that the shock and fright caused by the collision
subsequently resulted in her giving premature birth to an idiot child.
Though the case is remembered today principally for its articulation of
the thin skull principle, 6 at the time it was decided Dulieu was signifi-
cant for quite another reason. An earlier case had declared that fright,
unaccompanied by physical impact, was not a legally recognized in-
jury. In overruling that earlier decision, Dulieu permitted the court to
modify that earlier holding by determining that if fright were accompa-
nied by some physical manifestation of the mental injury, then the sub-
sequent injury was compensable. From this vantage, the Dulieu court
was able to go on to assert that the pregnancy, as a pre-existing condi-
tion, did not make her ultimate injury too remote from the defendant's
negligence in causing her mental fright:
If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently in-
jured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for
damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury
at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusu-
ally weak heart."
This thin skull dictum, that pregnancy did not make the plaintiff's ulti-
mate injury too remote, was ndt supported by the Dulieu court with
specific citations; rather, it appears in the opinion as a supplemental
aspect of the case's then more significant rejection of the physical im-
pact limitation for mental fright. The case nonetheless articulated the
essential precondition for the application of the thin skull principle: a
preexisting condition within a plaintiff, though unknown and reason-
ably unknowable to the defendant, would not bar that plaintiff's
recovery.
The fact that no precedent was offered in the opinion for the appli-
cation of the thin skull principle lends credence to the view that the
Dulieu decision was the first judicial recognition of it. However, a re-
view of American cases decided prior to 1901 contradicts that belief,
for it appears that at least in this country the thin skull principle was a
well known, widely utilized principle of tort law. The 1892 decision of
15. [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
16. See supra note 9.
17. [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 675.
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Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway'8 is typical. The pregnant plaintiff in
that case was a passenger on a streetcar; she claimed that as a result of
near collision between the vehicle in which she was riding and the de-
fendant's streetcar, she experienced extreme mental shock that caused
her to go into violent convulsions and eventually led to her giving pre-
mature birth. The court, in upholding an award of damages for the
miscarriage, reasoned that the railroad company's defense, which
sought to deny liability because of the plaintiff's predisposition to in-
jury, was untenable. The analysis is strikingly similar to that engaged
in by the Dulieu court:
If the recovery of a passenger in feeble health were to be lim-
ited to what he would have been entitled to had he been
sound, then, in case of a destruction by fire or wrecking of a
railroad car through the negligence of those in charge of it, if
all the passengers but one were able to leave it in time to es-
cape injury, and that one could not because sick or lame, he
could not recover at all. The suggestion mentioned would, if
carried to its logical consequences, lead to such a
conclusion. 19
Interestingly, the Purcell court, like the Dulieu court, applied the thin
skull principle only after rejecting the physical impact limitation on the
18. 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). See also Montgomery & E. Ry. v. Mallette, 9
So. 363 (Ala. 1891); Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Snyder, 117 Ind. 435 (1888); Jeffersonville,
M. & I. Ry. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568 (1872); Bodkin v. Cassady, 106 Iowa 334, 76 N.W. 772
(1898); Lapeleine v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 40 La. 661, 4 So. 875 (1888); Baltimore
City Pass. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619 (1883); Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 156
Mass'. 351, 30 N.E. 1013 (1892); Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 284 (1871); Jewell
v. Railway, 55 N.H. 84 (1874); Witrak v. Nassau Electric Ry., 52 A.D. 234, 65 N.Y.S. 257
(1900); Reading City Pass. Ry. v. Eckhert, 4 A. 530 (Pa. 1886); Sawyer v. Dunlany, 30 Tex.
479 (1867); Shenandoah Valley Ry. v. Moose, 83 Va. 827, 3 S.E. 796 (1887); Hawkins v.
Front St. Cable Ry., 3 Wash. 592, 28 P.1021 (1892); Steward v. City of Ripon, 38 Wisc. 584
(1875); Oliver v. Town of LaValle, 36 Wisc. 592 (1875). The thin skull appears also to have
been recognized in other common law countries. See, e.g., Linklater v. Minister of Rail-
ways, [1900] 18 N.Z.L.R. 536 ("A person suffering from any complaint who travels by rail-
way must take any risks that a person in his condition would be likely to incur through a
railway journey ... [but] the fact that the plaintiff at the time of the injury was suffering
from a disease or weakness, curable or incurable, though its tendency was to aggravate the
injury caused by the negligence, does not impair the plaintiff's right to recover." Id at 537);
Fitzpatrick v. Great W. Ry., 12 Up. Can. Q.B. 645 (1855); Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh &
Dist. Water, [1907] A.C. 291 (Scot.). In fact, an 1832 English decision discredits the view
that.Dulieu was the first decision to announce the thin skull principle within England. Boss
v. Litton, 172 Eng. Rep. 1030 (K.B. 1832) ("A foot passenger, though he may be infirm from
disease, has a right to walk in the carriage-way, and is entitled to the exercise of reasonable
care on the part of the persons driving carriages along it."). Id at 1031.
19. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 139, 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (1892).
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plaintiffs initial mental injury.2" The resolution of the cause-in-fact
issue, of whether the defendant's conduct was physically linked to the
plaintiff's ultimate injury without an independent intervening or super-
seding cause, enabled the court to apply the thin skull principle. The
common recognition of the two courts that physical causation was the
initial question led the two opinions toward a rationale that is compati-
ble with present understanding of the thin skull principle.2'
It is frustrating that the Purcell court, like the Dulieu court, failed
to provide guidance for the application of the thin skull principle. In
fact, a review of the American thin skull cases during this period
reveals few citations to precedent; instead, the majority of courts seem-
ingly relied on the common sense nature of the principle.22 In 1875 the
Iowa Supreme Court asserted the thin skull principle by boldly re-
jecting the defendant's predisposition to injury theory without citing
precedent: "If this doctrine [plaintiff predisposition] has ever been rec-
ognized by any court, the sooner, in the interest of humanity, it is aban-
doned the better."23 While these cases do little to indicate the legal
foundation of the rule, they are important in their implicit recognition
of another aspect of the thin skull principle: it is rooted in one of our
basic, if unarticulated, notions of fairness.
Voorheis, in his treatise on torts,24 articulated the most extensive
20. Courts following the physical impact test dismiss thin skull claims. See, e.g., Phillips
v. Dickerson, 85 l. 11 (1877); Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry., 54 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355 (1888).
21. See also Pittsburg & C. Ry. v. McClurg, 56 Pa. 294 (1867).
22. In Sorenson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 36 F.166 (Minn. 1888) the court stated: "I know
thatpost hoc is not always propter hoc, but wherepropter hoc is uncertain, thepost hoc may
often be decisive." Id at 167. One court appeared to reject the thin skull principle when the
plaintiff passenger of the defendant's common carrier claimed that the fright she exper-
ienced as a result of a fire in the defendant's car caused the suppression of her menses. The
court determined that the plaintiff had to "assume the risks" inherent in rail travel and
denied her recovery. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 40 Colo. 344 (1878). The decision
was frequently criticized in subsequent thin skull cases. See, e.g., Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry.
v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409, 3 N.E. 989 (1886). See also Bovee v. Town of Danville, 53 Vt. 183
(1880) (rejecting a claim for emotional trauma suffered by plaintiff following a miscarriage).
Similarly, thin skull injury claims brought against railroads in the form of breach of contract
actions were also unsuccessful. See, e.g., Brown v. Chicago Ry., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N.W. 356
(1882); McNamara v. Clintonville, 62 Wis. 211 (1885). See also Washington, Damages in
Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. Rev. 345 (1931); Washington, Damages in Contract at
Common Law, 48 L.Q. Rev. 90 (1932). Cf Mobile Ohio Ry. v. McArthur, 43 Miss. 180
(1870) (recognizing a contractual tort action for injuries to a rheumatic plaintiff); Heirn v.
McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17 (1856) (breach of carrier's contractual duty gives rise to a cause of
action sounding in tort).
23. Allison v. The C. & N.W. R. Co., 42 Iowa 274, 281 (1875).
24. G. VoORHEIs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR PER-
SONAL INuIuEs §§ 144-151, at 272-73 (1903) [hereinafter cited as VooRHms]. See also T.
BEVAN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 103 (W. Byrne & A. Gibb 4th ed. 1928); A. WATSON, DAM-
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early analysis of the thin skull principle. In comparing the early thin
skull cases of the middle and late nineteenth century, Voorheis offered
three arguments to support the principle. While these arguments are
helpful in identifying nineteenth century perceptions about the princi-
ple, they are superficial in that they fail to convey an understanding of
the principle's historical development. Voorheis' first argument in sup-
port of the thin skull principle is that if a court were to entertain de-
fenses premised on a plaintiff's predisposition to injury, then "a field
would be opened for speculation and expert evidence, which would
lead to confusion and doubt; which would travel into scientific, philo-
sophical and theoretical questions without limit, and which would be a
source of great expense. ' 25 The concern Voorheis confronts here is ac-
tually a cause-in-fact issue which, it should be remembered, was the
linchpin for the application of the thin skull principle in such cases as
Dulieu and Purcell.26 Voorheis errs by confusing proximate cause with
factual cause. If factual cause is not proved, the question of proximate
cause is not addressed. The second argument presented is that "any
person possessing or susceptible to these conditions would be subjected
to greater embarrassment and apprehension in pursuing his business,
trade or profession with their necessary effects, and to less considera-
tion and protection in his person than his more fortunate neighbor. '27
This rationale is appealing because it rests upon common sense justice
that is inherent in the thin skull principle but is wholly unsatisfactory if
applied to those unaware of their infirmities and susceptibilities. This
leads us to Voorheis' third justification for the principle:
no additional safeguard can be thrown around or given to
such persons; because it is impossible to do so, because many
persons are ignorant of these conditions in their systems, and
which might never appear except for the injury; and because
there is no means by which to anticipate the effect of an in-
jury, however severe or slight, as the effect so much depends
upon the physical condition of the person at the time of the
injury .... 28
Again, the argument is attractive in its distillation of the common sense
values the thin skull principle reflects. This attractiveness is supported
AGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES §§ 195-207 (1901); 4 T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 839 (1941); F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 51 (13th ed. 1929); F. TIFFANY,
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT § 76 (1893); S. THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE §§ 149-156 (1901).
25. VOORHEIS, supra note 24, at 276.
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. VOORHEIS, supra note 24 at 276.
28. Id
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by Voorheis' inclusion of those thin skull plaintiffs who do not know of
their infirmity. However, the argument is unpalatable because it fails
to provide a rational, logical, or historical foundation for the principle.
Whether or not the ultimate injury is foreseeable to the plaintiff, the
mere existence of the injury is no more a reason for holding the defend-
ant liable than it is to hold the plaintiff liable. The task is to explain
precisely why a defendant is assigned liability for these kinds of unex-
pected consequences-a justification as to why a plaintiff should be
compensated for such injuries evades the essential issue.
Voorheis' unfulfilling arguments should not be readily abandoned,
however. In his analysis of the subject, Voorheis attempts to reconcile
two potentially inconsistent policies. Just as a defendant should be
held liable in proportion to his conduct, an innocent party who suffers
injury at the hands of such a defendant should not be forced to absorb
the costs of his misfortune. The case of Derosier v. New England Tele-
phone & Telegraph29 is illuminating in its discussion of these competing
policies within tort law:
The foreseeable quality of an event following breach of duty
is always material upon the issue of accountability for the act.
Upon the question of causation, this quality is material only
as it operates through the moral aspect of the case, which not
infrequently has directed the course of the law. He should
have foreseen; therefore he is morally guilty. Causation, as
distinguished from duty, is purely a matter of producing a
subsequent event. In determining how far the law will trace
causation and afford a remedy, the facts as to the defendant's
intent, his imputable knowledge, or his justifiable ignorance
are often taken into account. The moral element is here the
factor that has turned close cases one way or the other. For
an intended injury the law is astute to discover even very re-
mote causation. For one which the defendant merely ought to
have anticipated it has often stopped at an earlier stage of the
investigation of causal connection. And as to those where
there was neither knowledge nor duty to foresee, it has usu-
ally limited accountability to direct and immediate results.3°
This aspect of the thin skull principle, that as between a wholly inno-
cent party and a culpable (or, perhaps, less innocent) party the latter
assumes liability, may do much to explain how it is that the thin skull
29. 81 N.H. 451, 130 A. 148 (1925).
30. Id at 463, 130 A. at 152.
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principle has remained virtually untouched in the past century while
other basic notions of tort law have undergone significant alteration.
31
If the thin skull principle is rooted in basic values which we share with
past generations, then its invulnerability over the years provides a com-
fortable argument for those tort scholars who accept such moralistic or
value oriented interpretations of legal history.
The theory that shared morality underlies and perpetuates the thin
skull principle is supported by references to a few nineteenth century
thin skull cases that cite criminal law as precedent for the application of
the principle. Hence, in Louisville & NA. Co. v. Jones,32 the plaintiffs
decedent suffered injuries in a train derailment, which, purportedly
combined with her pneumonia, caused her death. The court, though
apparently somewhat troubled by the factual relationship between the
derailment and the death, held that:
If the injury was caused by the negligence of the railroad
company. . and if it contributed to and hastened her death,
then the corporation would not be guiltless Tidwell v. State, 70
Ala. 33; Whart. Hom. § 382. This would be so in criminal
prosecutions, and must be at least equally so in a civil suit,
such as this. In such case the wrong and injury are, in fact,
the cause of the death.
33
This analogy to criminal law is interesting in that it not only supplies a
convenient body of law for precedent, but also unifies jurisprudential
philosophy with the common theme of moral culpability and inno-
cence. This approach is buttressed by abundant authority that could
enable one to trace the thin skull principle through criminal cases well
back into the seventeenth century.34 Sir Matthew Hale's Historia
Placitorum Coronae, one of the earliest treatises on criminal law, 35 con-
tains the following passage:
31. For example, the recognition of mental or emotional injury.
32. 83 Ala. 376, 3 So. 902 (1888).
33. Id at 377, 3 So. at 904. See, e.g., Gray v. Little, 126 N.C. 385, 35 S.E. 611 (1900);
Rex v. Martin, 172 Eng. Rep. 907 (1832). See also 1 S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 145 (1901).
34. See, e.g., I J. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PLEADING & EVIDENCE 917 (7th
ed. 1860); 2 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW, 347-48 (1872); D. POWER, ROSCOE'S DIGEST OF LAW
OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 660-61 (G. Sharswood 6th ed. 1866); see also Governor
Wall's Case, 28 Howell, St. Tr. 51 (1802); The Dean of St. Asaph, 21 Howell, St. Tr. 847,
1022 (1783) ("[If a man rising in his sleep walks into a china shop and breaks everything
about him, his being asleep is a complete answer to an indictment for trespass, but he must
answer in an action for everything he has done."); Livingston v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. 582
(1857); Commonwealth v. Fox, 7 Gray 585, 73 Mass. 585 (1856).
35. 1 SIR M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE (1736).
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If a man be sick of some such disease, which possibly by
course of nature would end his life in half a year, and another
gives him a wound or a hurt, which hastens his end by irritat-
ing and provoking the disease to operate more violently or
speedily, this hastening of his death sooner than it would have
been is homicide or murder, as the case happens, in him, that
gives the wound or hurt, for he doth not die simply ex visita-
tione dei, but the hurt that he receives hastens it, and an of-
fender of such a nature shall not apportion his own wrong,
and thus I have often heard that learned and wise judge jus-
tice Rolle frequently direct.
36
The "morality" approach finds additional strength in other inten-
tional tort cases from this era, where the thin skull principle seems to
have been similarly active.37 As an example, Vosburg v. Putney38 in-
volved a battery which arose when the defendant kicked the plaintiff's
infected leg. The defendant was held liable for the aggravated injury
his conduct caused. 9 Similarly, in Bray v. Latham,40 a decision
reached in 1888, the court upheld an action in conversion for the aggra-
vated personal injuries suffered by the emphysemic plaintiff when the
defendant set fire to her home. In these and other cases,41 it could be
persuasively argued that the moral culpability of the defendant appears
to have justified the imposition of civil liability much as the criminal
defendant would have assumed criminal liability.
This analysis is cogent in several broad respects. First, the use of
the thin skull principle in negligence and intentional tort cases acts so
as to extend a defendant's liability in the same way that the culpability
factor operates in criminal cases.42 Second, the use of the thin skull
principle in personal injury suits mirrors its use in the criminal arena.43
36. Id at 428. See also I W. HAWKiNS, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 119 (1701).
37. See generall, Focht, Proximate Cause in the Law of Homicide,-With Special Refer-
ence to California Cases, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. 19 (1938).
38. 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
39. See also Watson v. Rheinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N.W. 798 (1901).
40. 81 Ga. 640, 8 S.E. 64 (1888).
41. See, e.g., Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880) (blind girl recovered for fright occa-
sioned by defendant's trespass and assault in her bedroom); Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss. 906,
ai'd, 61 Miss. 181 (1883).
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43. That the thin skull principle is applied to personal injuries, as opposed to property
injuries, is one of the more distinctive aspects of the principle. But see Rowe, The Demise of
the Thin Skull Rule, 40 MOD. L. REv. 377, 381 (1977). This distinction is evidenced by the
recognition that suits which are essentially personal injury claims but premised on actions
designed to vindicate property injuries also permit the application of the thin skull principle.
Hence, in Boushell v. J.H. Beers, Inc., 215 Pa. Super. 439, 258 A.2d 682 (1969), the plaintiff
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Finally, the notion of moral culpability in criminal law would go far in
explaining, for example, the Duleu court's evident desire to establish
factual causation between the defendant's careless driving and the
plaintiff's premature delivery. 4 Once that cause-in-fact determination
was made, it is remembered, the Dulieu defendant's tort (in causing the
fright) provided the court with an opportunity to consider his conduct
morally culpable and hold him liable for the plaintiff's subsequent in-
jury under the thin skull principle.
As tempting as the morality approach is in providing an accepta-
ble explanation for the thin skull principle, it suffers from an ele-
mentary flaw. Negligence differs from both criminal law and
intentional tort law in that the moral approach focuses upon the de-
fendant's moral culpability. While the Derosier opinion clearly indi-
cates that the moral factor is not completely absent from negligence,45
it lies for the most part in the background, to be utilized only when the
other factors (for example, duty, breach, factual cause) fail to provide a
satisfactory result. To the extent that an actor's morality is relevant in
negligence suits, the thin skull principle is understandable, predictable,
and explainable by value oriented, moral interpretations; however, to
the extent that culpability is less prominent in negligence issues, the
"moral culpability" theory is inadequate.
This insufficiency of the morality explanation becomes more evi-
dent if it is considered in light of those negligence cases where morality
plays a relatively minor role in assigning liability. Cases such as Wal-
ton v. Booth I show that the thin skull principle applies just as easily in
these situations as it does in intentional torts. In that case, the com-
plaint arose against an apothecary who negligently sold a pregnant wo-
man zinc poison rather than epsom salts. The druggist was held liable
for her death, not so much because his error was so egregious, but be-
cause he failed to exercise the "exceedingly cautious" duty of care he
owed the plaintiffs decedent by reason of his position.47 Similarly, the
brought an action in trespass against the defendant construction company for a personal
injury he received on his property from a rock hurled by defendant's workers. The subse-
quent aggravation of an ulcer was held to be compensable under the thin skull principle
even though trespass is a property tort. Furthermore, the thin skull principle will entitle a
plaintiff to recover certain kinds of property damage if proximately related to the physical
injury of the plaintiff. Hence, in Bernstein v. Western Union Tel. Co., 174 Misc. 74, 18
N.Y.S.2d 856 (1940), the plaintiff recovered for the cost of her glasses after the defendant's
messenger boy collided with her.
44. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. 34 La. Ann. 913 (1882).
47. Id at 915.
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numerous railroad cases of this era demonstrate that the thin skull
principle applies just as easily in cases where the railroad was grossly
negligent or reckless as in cases where the railroad was as much a vic-
tim of circumstances as the plaintiff.4 8 Indeed, recognition of the thin
skull principle in train injury cases brought as breach of contract ac-
tions indicates that the principle may be related to concerns of moral
culpability in most cases, but that it is not intrinsically dependent on
moral values.4 9 If the thin skull principle is valid because of the moral
culpability of a tortfeasor, then the court's unhesitating application of
the thin skull principle in the decisions not grounded on moral values
suggests the moral theory alone does not fully explain the true nature
of the thin skull principle and that a fuller explanation must be found
elsewhere.
It should be understood that such an alternative does not contra-
dict the moral rationale but rather complements it by providing a logi-
cal and historical depth to understanding the principle. With this
attitude in mind, a brief review of the early development of our tort law
provides a broader perspective on the thin skull problem.
Tort law, as it developed in England during and after the Middle
Ages, was far different from the tort law of today. As the following
passage from Holdsworth points out, it was a harsh, austere law that in
many respects closely resembled the contemporary strict liability
approach:
The liability so imposed stretches far beyond the proximate
consequence of any supposed negligence. The law is regarding
not the culpability of the actor, but the feelings of the injured
person whose sufferings may be traced ultimately to the act.
This idea is well illustrated by the oath which a defendant
must swear if he would escape liability. He must swear that
he has done nothing whereby the person slain was "nearer to
death or further from life."50
This law was clearly concerned with the plaintiff's condition, and the
moral standing of the defendant was largely irrelevant in determining
liability. Thus, the decrees of King Aethelbert, the earliest recorded
laws of England that were written in the sixth century, read like a mod-
em worker's compensation schedule:
48. See supra note 18.
49. See supra note 22.
50. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 52 (3d ed. 1923) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH]. See also Wigston, The Origins of Tort Liability, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 264 (1923).
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36. If the outer covering of the skull is broken, 10 shillings
shall be paid as compensation.
37. If both (the scalp and skull) are broken, 20 shillings shall
be paid as compensation."
Such laws provide little opportunity for consideration of the defend-
ant's moral standing. But more importantly, they established the basic
axiom of early law. In Holdsworth's words, "a man acts at his peril.
'5 2
It is the injury and the defendant's conduct that are of concern here;
legal cause, as a test of that relationship, is a crudely formulated notion,
for the historian is careful to remind us that as harsh as these laws
were, they were also laws of men.13 Where, for example, a case was
presented in which the plaintiff was guilty of what we might describe as
contributory negligence, the "obvious justice" of the case could super-
sede the rigidity of the law to deny such a plaintiff recovery. However,
absent such factors, early tort law is a hostile world to the moralist.
It is here that we may find the first traces of the thin skull princi-
ple. The Brehon Law, a Celtic Code in effect in Ireland sometime well
before the arrival of Christianity, contains the following description of
how early tort claims would have been reached:
When a person had once been maimed, and had recovered
part or all of his body fine, his position in the case of subse-
quent injuries was not altered for the worse. No subsequent
wrongdoer could insist that the injured person should be rated
as a damaged article.54
If the passage is read with Holdsworth's guiding caution, the thin skull
principle is revealed as a notion that was originally rooted in the an-
cient ethic of strict liability: that a man acts at his peril. Such an un-
derstanding highlights and explains the innately quintessential feature
of the thin skull principle: it acts to extend a defendant's liability with-
out qualification. While it may easily be surmised that the common
sense value of the principle may have tempered the application of it in
any given case, it is equally clear that the veneer of the morality ration-
ale, evidenced in nineteenth century case law, is a more recent con-
struction that has concealed and distorted the fundamental nature of
the principle.
The foregoing historical analysis, by its illumination of the essen-
51. THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST KINGS 75 (F. Attenborough ed. 1927).
52. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 51.
53. See F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 430 (5th ed. 1929).
54. S. BRYANT, LIBERTY, ORDER & LAW IN THE IRISH FREE STATE 236 (2d ed. 1970)
(quoting 3 THE ANCIENT LAWS OF IRELAND Cix-Cx).
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tial features and motivating values of the thin skull principle, can pro-
vide the basis for a fuller articulation of the principle's constituent parts
than has heretofore been possible. An enlightened understanding of
the thin skull principle, in turn, provides the basis for understanding
the uses and abuses of the principle in tort law.
It has been seen that one significant attribute of the principle is
that it requires a pre-existing physical condition within the plaintiff that
is unknown and reasonably unknowable to the defendant.55 Thus,
questions concerning the higher degree of care defendants are held to
because of the knowledge of the peculiar sensitivity are directed to is-
sues of duty and not to proximate cause as is the thin skull principle. It
has also been seen that the operation of the thin skull principle is pref-
aced by a determination of the "cause-in-fact" relationship between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury.56 Moreover, the thin
skull principle itself is prefatory to a concern for the extent of damages
derived from the injury.57 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
thin skull principle works in the area of proximatecause subsequent to
the determination that the defendant has committed a complete tort.
58
Thus, in negligence the court must first recognize the breach of a duty
by the defendant, causing both factually and proximately an injury
upon which the aggravated injury follows. Upon this finding the court
can properly proceed to consider the subsequent injury and, via the
thin skull principle, bypass the proximate cause foreseeability
limitation.
Furthermore, the recognition of this unqualified extension of lia-
bility as the paramount feature of the principle is of benefit in under-
standing the different rationales that have been utilized in support of
the thin skull principle. In the amoral environment of early jurispru-
dence, the thin skull principle could be applied with the cold strictness
of cold precepts-limited perhaps only by the "obvious justice" of a
given situation. However, with the decline of tort actions based on
writs and the concomitant arrival of our modern classifications of torts,
strict liability was supplemented and replaced with torts conceived and
ordered in terms of the defendant's purpose: intentional and uninten-
tional (negligent) torts.59 In such an environment, the simplistic appeal
of strict liability became acrid to nineteenth century moral values and
55. See supra note 5.
56. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 7-9.
58. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
59. See generally Green, The Regenerative Process in Law, 33 IND. L.J. 166, 168 (1958).
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compelled the creation of thin skull rationalizations based on culpabil-
ity. Thus, criminal law may have step-fathered the thin skull principle
through the moralistic climatic changes of the nineteenth century; how-
ever, it did not significantly alter the essential civil, amoral nature of
the principle. The shift in focus from the plaintiff's injury of early law
to the more modem concern with the defendant's 'conduct was a shift
that was motivated by the offended sensibilities of men rather than in-
herent insufficiencies in the principle. As the following analysis makes
clear, it is a shift which has confused, rather than clarified, the work-
ings of the thin skull principle.
With this fuller understanding of the workings of the thin skull
principle, a further evaluation of present popular conceptions of the
principle can be provided. Perhaps the fairest modem statement of the
thin skull principle is presented by the Restatement Second of Torts:
The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another
although a physical condition of the other which is neither
known nor should be known to the actor makes the injury
greater than that which the actor as a reasonable man should
have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct.60
Under the Restatement, the thin skull principle works to extend a de-
fendant's liability where the test of proximate cause would otherwise
threaten to limit it. As Dean Prosser explains:
It is as if a magic circle were drawn about the person, and one
who breaks it, even by as much as a cut finger, becomes liable
for all resulting harm to the person although it may be death.
The defendant is held liable when his negligence operates
upon a concealed physical condition, such as pregnancy, or a
latent disease, to produce consequences which he reasonably
could not anticipate.61
Prosser's metaphor of the "magic circle" is accurate in its description of
the unqualified extension of liability directed under the thin skull prin-
ciple, but it fails, as does the Restatement, to capture the constituent
parts of the thin skull principle as well as the more central role the
principle has played in the development of proximate cause theories.
This occurs because the artificial divisions inherent in the Restatement
format lack explicit relational ties across broad areas. Thus, under the
Restatement, it could superficially appear that a defendant could be
held liable for a breach of a duty owed to a plaintiff without the initial
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, at § 461.
61. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 261.
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and crucial determination that the breach first established a legally rec-
ognized injury. Failing so to articulate the thin skull's relation to fore-
seeability, the Restatement has perhaps invited premature and
erroneous application of the principle, which in turn has produced ulti-
mate findings of liability that have perverted the intended and true ef-
fect of the principle.62
III. PERVASIVE APPLICATION
Perhaps more fundamentally than this, the Restatement, Dean
Prosser, and other modern commentators have failed to recognize the
thin skull principle as not limited solely to the foreseeability aspect of
proximate cause in negligent torts,63 but instead applicable throughout
tort law.' It is here maintained that this principle should be seen to
apply wherever a tort is present and the injured party has suffered fore-
seeable and unforeseeable harm. The effect of this application is com-
pensation for both foreseeable indirect harm and unforeseeable direct
harm. In the direct causation test of proximate cause the thin skull
principle is not needed. With the foreseeability test the thin skull con-
cept is used to reach direct causation results.
Hence, in the area of intentional torts, the defendant who mali-
62. Some courts have appeared to treat the thin skull principle as a substitute for the
plaintiff's burden to establish a cause-in-fact relationship between his injury and the defend-
ant's conduct. The point was articulated by the court in Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Re-
aney, 42 Md. 117 (1875):
But it is equally true, that no wrong-doer ought to be allowed to apportion or
qualify his own wrong; and that, as a loss has actually happened whilst his own
wrongful act was in force and operation, he ought not to be permitted to set up as a
defense, that there was a more immediate cause of the loss, if that cause was put
into operation by his own wrongful act. To entitle such party to exemption, he
must show not only that the same loss might have happened, but that it must have
happened if the act complained of had not been done.
.d. at 37 (emphasis in original). See also supra notes 14, 21 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
64. § 461 is the only recognition of the thin skull principle in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), supra note 9, and the principle was wholly absent from the original RESTATEMENT.
However, in 1973, a broader expression of § 461 was proposed under chapter 47, Damages,
which was intended to expand § 461:
§ 917 Harms Resuldingfrom Tortious Conduct. One who tortiously harms the per-
son or property of another is subject to liability for damages for the consequences
of the harm in accordance with the rules as to whether the conduct is a legal cause
of the consequences.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). While the comments
to the proposed revision indicate a recognition of the thin skull's application throughout tort
law, it is also evident that its authors considered the rule as the "exception" to the rule of
foreseeability. As will be developed subsequently in the text, such a description inade-
quately accounts for the historical or analytical role of the principle.
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ciously kicks the arthritic's knee is liable for the full injury resulting.6"
The defendant storekeeper who falsely imprisons a suspected shoplifter
is liable for the aggravation of the imprisoned plaintiff's pre-existing
mental condition.66 As the court in Derosier67 pointed out, proximate
cause has never been much of a problem in the area of intentional con-
duct.68 Compensating the thin skull loss is not a problem as all injuries
caused by the wrongful act are compensable.
In the area of strict liability the thin skull principle would seem to
apply for at least one of two reasons. First, the ideas of causation gen-
erated in negligence are carried forward under the theory of strict lia-
bility. Second, the courts exhibit a willingness to provide a remedy for
injury under strict tort because of notions of risk and danger. This will-
ingness easily encompasses the thin skull concept.
Liability for injuries caused by failures in product safety typically
falls under varying theories-negligence, strict liability in tort, or war-
ranty. The above analysis covers the use of the thin skull principle in
the first two areas. Under the warranty theory, a manufacturer who
breaches express and implied warranties in the production of make-up
which contains sufficient quantities of poison so as to affect a normal
person will be liable for the consequences realized by a plaintiff buyer
who receives aggravated injuries because of an endocrine condition.69
Thus, the principle would seem to be applicable under any theory of
liability for lack of product safety.
In the nuisance area of tort law, it is common knowledge that for
the plaintiff to recover there must be a showing of substantial harm.
A sensitive person suffering harm will not suffice, as the harm must be
65. See supra notes 38-40.
66. Culp v. Federated Dep't Stores, 11 Ohio App. 2d 165, 229 N.E.2d 100 (1965). See
also Post Pub. Co. v. Peck, 199 F. 6 (1st Cir. 1912) (defamation); Jacquith v. Stanger, 79
Idaho 49, 310 P.2d 805 (1957) (trespass to chattels); Botkin v. Cassady, 106 Iowa 334, 76
N.W. 722 (1898) (duress); Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co., 64 Ohio App. 29, 27 N.E.2d
787 (1940), rev'd on other grounds, 68 Ohio App. 505, 42 N.E.2d 223 (1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 141 Ohio St. 162, 47 N.E.2d 211 (1943) (trespass to property); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21
Wis.2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); As-
chermann v. The Phillip Best Brewing Co., 45 Wis. 262 (1878) (conversion).
67. Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 463, 130 A. 145, 152 (1925).
68. Id
69. Gober v. Revlon Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Smith v. Denholm &
McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N.E. 631 (1934); Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining Co., 50
Mich. 163, 15 N.W. 65 (1883) (blasting); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378
P.2d 298 (1963).
70. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, at § 821F.
[Vol. 15
THIN SKULL PLAINTIFF CONCEPT
judged against the suffering of a normal person in the community.7'
This does not necessarily prevent the sensitive (thin-skull) person from
obtaining a judgment. If the cause of action is established vis a vis
harm to a normal person, the sensitive person may be compensated for
injuries. As stated by the court in Soap Corporation of America v.
Balis 72:
The effect of the odors on persons of ordinary sensibilities was
material in determining whether or not there was a nuisance.
The maintenance of the nuisance was a tort. A right of dam-
ages for injuries proximately resulting from the nuisance was
not limited to persons of ordinary sensibilities. Appellant was
liable to any of the plaintiffs who received injuries proxi-
mately caused by the commission of the tort.
73
In the area of deceit or misrepresentation the threefold bases of
liability apply. As the analysis above indicated, the thin skull plaintiff
principle ought to apply to each theory of recovery. Under the heading
of misrepresentation, reliance is a key issue,74 and the reliance by the
plaintiff must be reasonable.75 Despite this requirement, persons truly
susceptible to misrepresentations are protected.76 This is certainly
analogous to the thin skull principle.
As in the nuisance area, sensitivity is not helpful in defamation to
establish the cause of action. William Prosser tells us that:
[a] defamatory communication usually has been defined as
one which tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided. This defi-
nition is certainly too narrow. . . .Defamation is rather that
which tends to injure "reputation" in the popular sense; to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which
plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant
feelings or opinions against him.77
However, in the true fashion of the thin skull principle, "[w]hen the
71. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1956); Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15
N.E. 768 (1888); Rozell v. Northern Pac. Ry. 39 N.D. 475, 167 N.W. 489 (1918).
72. 223 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1949).
73. Id at 962. See also Fish v. Hanna Coal & Ore Corp., 164 F. Supp. 870 (Minn.
1958); Krebs v. Hermann, 90 Colo. 61, 6 P.2d 907 (1931); Heim v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17
(1856) (wrongful death).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, at § 531.
75. Id
76. Hyma v. Lee, 338 Mich. 31, 60 N.W.2d 920 (1943); Adan v. Steinbrecher, 116 Minn.
174, 133 N.W. 477 (1911).
77. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 739 (footnotes omitted).
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
cause of action is once made out, either as libel or slander per se, or by
proof of special damages of a pecuniary character, it is generally agreed
that plaintiff may recover additional damages for his mental distress,
wounded feelings and humiliation."7 8
The balance of the concerns of tort law-invasion of privacy, mis-
use of legal procedure, and interference with advantageous relation-
ships-is largely based on intentional or willful conduct with some
development into negligent acts. As the analysis above indicates, no-
tions of the thin skull principle will apply to these bases of liability.
There is yet a more intriguing aspect to the present perception of
the thin skull principle which, in light of the historical 'development of
the principle, deserves additional attention. We have been accustomed
to considering the thin skull principle not solely within negligence, but
particularly as the exception to the rule of foreseeability.7 9 However, if
the thin skull principle is viewed under another proximate cause test,
"direct causation," it can be seen that the thin skull principle is the test
of proximate cause. That is, insofar as cause-in-fact considerations de-
termine liability in direct causation cases, the absence of the artificial
legal barrier to defendant's liability is, in fact, the effective presence of
the thin skull principle.8 0 If it is remembered that direct causation the-
ories of proximate cause antedated foreseeability theories,8' describing
the thin skull principle as the exception to the test of foreseeability mis-
conceives the historical, analytical, and logical relation that the thin
skull principle has had with the notion of proximate cause.
The point may be clarified if it is recognized that a test of proxi-
mate cause evaluates two sets of facts in establishing whether the cause-
in-fact chain is of sufficient strength to hold the defendant legally re-
sponsible for the plaintiff's injury. One set of facts involves links of the
chain within the plaintiff's body, and the other set of facts considered
involves the links outside the plaintiff's body. Proximate cause oper-
ates to test the strength of the chain according to the given standard
(e.g., foreseeability). Two observations can be made at this juncture:
78. W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, Cases and Materials on Torts 989 (6th ed.
1976).
79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Crane Elevator Co. v. Lippert, 63 F. 942 (7th Cir. 1894). In that case, the
plaintiff sought recovery for a fall when tuberculosis developed soon after the injury. Rely-
ing on St. Paul R.R. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876) and other direct cause precedents, the
court held the subsequent injury compensable. 63 F.2d at 948.
81. See Shavell, An Analysis of Causation andthe Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980); Seidelson, Some Reeetions on Proximate Cause, 19 DuQ. L.
REv. 1 (1980).
[Vol. 15
THIN SKULL PLAINTIFF CONCEPT
first, the history of the development of differing proximate cause theo-
ries (e.g., "direct causation," "natural and probable consequences,"
"orbit of risk," and the test of "foreseeability") has occurred exclusively
in the arena of facts that exist outside the plaintiff's body. 2 Thus,
whether the railroad should be held liable for a burned barn produces
differing results under each proximate cause theory. Second, as to
those injuries received by the asthmatic within the barn, the thin skull
principle (first in the form of the theory of direct causation) obviated
the test of proximate cause. The same result (i e., holding the defend-
ant liable) also obtains under any of the subsequent proximate cause
theories. If these observations are accurate, the theory of direct causa-
tion (te., the thin skull principle incarnate) allows the courts to develop
standards by which to limit a defendant's liability as to those forces
outside the plaintiff's body where traditional strict liability rules pre-
vent such limits, while these courts still retain strict control over inter-
nal forces cases. The natural and probable consequences test, the orbit
of risk test, and the current foreseeability test thus appear as refine-
ments of that desire to take into account readily observable physical
phenomena and evaluate them on the basis of moral value standards of
legal proximity. As to those causal links within the plaintiff's body,
however, no such scrutiny has occurred.83 Instead, the law has retained
the strict application of the thin skull's dictate: a man acts at his peril.
It is in this way that the thin skull principle should be more properly
considered as the historical and logical parent of the test of foreseeabil-
ity rather than its exception."
There exists a difficult to explain schism that emerges in questions
of proximate cause; on the one hand, there are well-developed theories
of proximate cause applied when evaluating forces outside the plain-
tiff's person, while on the other hand the thin skull principle retains
vitality in the judicial evaluation of forces located within the plaintiff's
body. It may be suggested that the factors that occur within a plaintiff's
body have not been scrutinized under proximate cause analysis because
they are not readily observable and are not well understood. However,
to the extent that a plaintiff is unable conclusively to prove the cause-
in-fact relationship between the blow on the head and the subsequent
82. This dichotomization is suggested in Williams, The Risk Princ4ile, 77 L.Q. REv. 179,
179-80, 193-97 (1961).
83. Thus, Sorenson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 36 F. 166, 167 (Minn. 1888) (".post hoc is not
alwayspropter hoc, but wherepropter hoc is uncertain, thepost hoc may often be decisive")
articulates the difficulty of trying to determine causation when the specific links of the chain
are not well understood.
84. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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growth of a tumor on the wound, the idea provides tenuous justification
for presuming the existence of a sufficient legally recognized relation-
ship.85 To distinguish between two sets of facts on the basis of ability
to observe is to distinguish without reason since physical causation
must be established initially. It might be suggested that the law, as a
matter of social policy, should determine that the more culpable party
assume liability for the injury. However, though we often ascribe cul-
pability to the negligent tortfeasor, that fault is attached to the breach
of a duty--to stretch that fault to include responsibility for unexpected
injuries, and to do so through the amoral vehicle of the thin skull prin-
ciple, is to bastardize the analytical forces involved. The moral argu-
ment, which weighs relative culpability, fits uncomfortably into the
situation without rational historical support.
It is here contended that the thin skull principle is rooted in strict
liability, and cannot be fully understood in terms of morality. As ap-
pealing as such moral justifications might appear, they deny the vener-
able validity of the legal maxim that a defendant acts at his peril. The
validity of the principle must be understood within this conceptual
framework and tested accordingly.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the development of the thin skull princi-
ple, focusing on its role in both the development of proximate cause
and broader fields of tort liability. The thin skull principle is an inte-
gral part of the law of torts, and questions directed to its continued
validity must be examined within the context of that historical frame-
work. Additionally, the breadth of application of the principle indi-
cates that it is a basic tool of tort law. As an exception to the doctrine
of foreseeability in proximate cause, it is useful in obtaining recovery
for the legitimate suffering of plaintiffs. As a broadly based concept of
the law of torts, it aids the teaching and understanding of seemingly
anomalous notions.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
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